On 13 July 2026, HMRC published a consultation on simplifying the process for obtaining treaty relief from UK withholding tax on interest paid overseas.

The consultation considers whether UK payers should be able to apply treaty relief at source without first obtaining a formal direction from HMRC. If implemented, this

On May 5, 2026, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) released Revenue Procedure 2026-21 (the “Rev. Proc.”), which reinstates a program under which taxpayers may request private letter rulings (“PLRs”) on “significant issues” arising in certain corporate transactions[1] without asking the IRS to rule on the entire integrated transaction.[2]

Update: The National Taxpayer Advocate has published a blog post urging taxpayers to evaluate whether they have claims for refund based on the recent Abdo and Kwong decisions. Importantly, the Taxpayer Advocate suggests that the argument for penalty and interest relief based on the COVID pandemic disaster declarations is

On March 19, 2026, in Jones Bluff, LLC v. Commissioner, 166 T.C. No. 6 (2026), the Tax Court held that a partnership could not assert due process claims to invalidate an IRS adjustment on behalf of its partners under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (the “BBA”) regime. The

Although many of the procedural rules for auditing partnerships at the federal level have changed under the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015 (the “BBA”), some principles—like the effect of actual notice—remain the same. Under the BBA, the IRS proposes partnership-level adjustments in a Notice of Proposed Partnership Adjustment (“NOPPA”) and later finalizes them in a Notice of Final Partnership Adjustment (“FPA”). If the IRS issues the FPA after the statute of limitations expires, the partnership can seek to invalidate it as untimely.

A reviewed Tax Court opinion filed March 9, 2026—Mammoth Cave Property, LLC v. Commissioner, No. 5401-24, 166 T.C. No. 4—shows the limits of “defective notice” arguments when the partnership actually received the NOPPA and participated in the process.

On February 10, 2026, Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New York ruled in United States v. Heppner that documents generated through a consumer version of Anthropic’s Claude AI were not protected by the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine under the circumstances presented. The decision appears to be the first to squarely address privilege and work product claims arising from a non-lawyer’s use of a consumer-grade insecure, non-enterprise AI tool for “legal research,” as well as the potential consequences of inputting privileged information (provided to an individual by counsel) into an AI tool. However, putting the novelty of the AI context aside, Judge Rakoff grounded his analysis in traditional privilege principles: that disclosure of privileged communications to a third party in circumstances that undermine confidentiality (here, the corporation operating the AI tool) may result in waiver. And that an AI tool is just that – a tool, not an attorney. Accordingly, this decision reinforces the importance of only using properly secured AI tools with confidential or privileged information and for decisions about using AI in the privileged context to be made by those who best appreciate the risks involved: i.e., lawyers.

Compensation is generally subject to federal income tax and FICA tax when compensation is actually paid to an employee. However, nonqualified deferred compensation (NQDC) may be subject to FICA taxation before federal income taxation under a FICA tax special timing rule. The scope of NQDC subject to FICA taxation is

On June 17, 2025, the Tax Court opinion in AbbVie Inc. and Subsidiaries v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue was issued,[1] holding that the approximately $1.6 billion termination fee AbbVie (a Delaware corporation) paid to its abandoned merger partner Shire plc (an Irish company) was properly an ordinary deductible business

On May 28, 2025, in Soroban Capital Partners LP v. Commissioner (T.C. Memo 2025-52) (“Soroban II”), the Tax Court held the active role of limited partners in a fund manager caused them to fail to qualify as “limited partners” for purposes of section 1402(a)(13) and, therefore, the limited

Companies are increasingly allowing their chief executive officers and, in certain circumstances, other executives to use corporate jets (which may be chartered flights or fractionally or fully owned aircraft) for personal use due to various reasons. Although this benefit may be a relatively small percentage of an executive’s overall compensation